the relationships between substance use, addiction, agency, subjectivity, responsibility, treatment and punishment. Alongside this, judges and other quasi-judicial figures are frequently enjoined to make decisions about the nature of these relationships, often with major implications for the 2 For clarity's sake this article will use the expression 'addiction' to refer to the condition that is also at times called 'dependence' in legal documents, except where quoting those documents. While debate about the terminology rages in medical and psychological contexts such as in the negotiations surrounding the DSM-5 (Keane, Moore and Fraser 2011) , the two terms are generally used interchangeably in legal settings, with variations depending on the prevailing medical terminology rather than on legal distinctions between the two. individuals concerned. The role of notions of addiction in criminal law beyond proceedings related directly to substance possession, use, production and dealing, receives little scholarly attention and analysis. Even more rarely considered are the many non-criminal legal contexts in which notions of addiction play a decisive part. It is to these many areas we devote the remainder of this article, our aim being to document a range of Australian non-criminal legal contexts in which notions of addiction are relevant to proceedings and outcomes. Thereafter, adopting a case study method taken from the work of science and technologies studies scholars Annemarie Mol and John Law (2002) , we examine three specific pieces of legislation that bear upon addiction in some way. Our aim is to highlight their definitions and assumptions, and to consider the implications of inconsistencies and other weaknesses. In doing so, we raise questions about legal treatments of addiction also of relevance beyond Australia.
BEYOND THE CRIMINAL LAW
There are many ways in which the civil law grapples with questions of 'addiction'. These range from personal injury lawsuits pertaining to tobacco, pharmaceuticals and other consumables such as food, carbonated soft drinks and video games. Other quasi-judicial realms are also implicated in the regulation of addiction. Sporting tribunals, for example, deal with questions about licit and illicit drug use, and other administrative and executive bodies consider substance use, abuse and addiction in possible mitigation of other legal issues (e.g. traffic infringements and social security breaches). Despite the sometimes central place of addiction in these other legal realms, there has been a general tendency -with some exceptions (Gibson 2009 , Kelly and Igelman 2009 , Miller 2010 , Flacks 2012 , Race 2012 ) -to neglect them. As well, there have been few attempts to engage in comparative analyses of non-criminal contexts: an approach which can be productive for reasons that we will explain below. These oversights may be based on an assumption that the criminal law has the greatest potential to impact the lives of those labelled addicts, especially where criminal sanctions and/or mandatory treatment is at issue. Yet the way in which 'addiction' is understood, constituted and managed in these 'other' legal realms can have as much significance for the lives of those individuals as criminal sanctions. Much is at stake in this respect, especially when we consider that classifying someone as an 'addict' may have implications for their right to care for and work with children, other employment rights, their right to receive compensation, and more. It is vital, therefore, that we attend to how these various legal realms constitute addiction and the addict, and the possible implications of these practices.
Importantly, different legal realms are constituted in fundamentally distinct ways. Among other things, legal standards and proofs are different in civil and criminal law. So too are the legislative frameworks, available remedies, protocols for assessing drug use and addiction and the key decision-makers. The civil law has a unique set of concerns and remedies (to investigate the manifestation of injury and assign responsibility for it, for instance). Lawsuits pertaining to tobacco use and nicotine addiction (see below) necessarily demand consideration of the agency and responsibility of a range of subjects. The available tools, frameworks, and remedies differ markedly from those available through the criminal law, so that ideas about addiction, substances, agency and responsibility are necessarily characterised by complexity. In other words, the law enacts addiction as ontologically 'multiple', or, to use an expression drawn from the work of science studies theorist Annemarie Mol, as 'more than one [ontological reality] and less than many' (Mol 2002) . For all of these reasons, we are likely to find considerable variation in the ways addiction is conceived and enacted in law. As Elizabeth Joh (2009: 175) has pointed out, although legal scholars, practitioners and politicians might talk about 'the response to an unwanted addictive behavior … there is no unified social or legal response'. Joh goes on to argue that, Law and society respond to the problem of addictive behavior, and their responses in turn define and interpret the addict and addiction in question. Addiction characterizes the use of many substances, licit and illicit, and thus the characterization of the addict in these different settings suggests comparative discussion. (2009: 175; our emphasis) The notion that the law has a constitutive effect (in, for example, producing the 'addict') both resonates with and departs from earlier work by the second author on the operation of concepts of addiction in official contexts, in this case policy and service provision within the state of Victoria, Australia . Challenging conventional understandings of policymaking as a process by which social problems are simply identified and addressed, Moore and Fraser (2013) adopt a critical approach based on the work of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1994) and feminist theorist Paola Marrati (2006) . Social problems such as addiction do not, they argue, exist prior to the policy-making process. Instead they are constituted within it. Indeed, addiction treatment policy and practice are fundamental elements in the process by which 'addiction' is constituted:
Our study findings suggest that alcohol and other drug treatment policy in Victoria does not merely identify and respond to a pre-existing condition called 'addiction'; instead, it is one of the processes through which addiction is produced. In other words, the problem of addiction emerges as an effect of treatment service provision rather than being the precursor to it. This approach can be contrasted with a conventional 'realist' perspective (Saldanha 2003) in which addiction is understood as a biological, natural or essential fact that pre-exists its identification and enactment in policy or practice. Similarly, the law can be understood as a realm within which addiction is constituted rather than simply reflected or addressed. In approaching observations of court practice and interviews with program workers, Murphy explores how individuals are selected for the drug court, the basis upon which they are diverted into treatment programs and the model (or models) of addiction that are utilised by the court and those tasked with delivering treatment services. In conducting her analysis Murphy makes a number of useful observations about the operation of the drug court:
While the drug court program emphasised that its goal was to treat the problem of addiction, in reality a person's criminal record determined eligibility for the program more often than the criminal evaluation. (2011: 280) Murphy's point is that individuals were often diverted into the program regardless of how often they consumed drugs, which drugs they consumed or how they understood their relationship to drugs. Importantly, she found that people who consumed alcohol -as opposed to illicit drugstended to be categorised as addicts less often. As well, individuals who sold drugs were often moved into a treatment program on the basis that they had an addiction, regardless of whether or not they actually consumed drugs. As Murphy also notes, 'several staff members of a treatment program affiliated with the drug court also revealed that they believed the majority of clients that the court sent to their treatment facility did not have significant drug problems' (2011: 281). Where people who sold -but did not consume -drugs were receiving treatment for a drug addiction, service providers managed this by suggesting that individual drug dealers had an addiction to money, or to the drug 'scene' or 'lifestyle'. Murphy concludes that 'each stage of the program involved an ambiguous notion of addiction' that virtually 'any problem could be placed ' within (2011: 287-288) . Although Murphy does not put it in quite these terms, her study is a useful example of the way that a set of legal practices and imperatives can converge to constitute both addiction and the addict. Whereas Murphy might be inclined to observe that the drug court produces an expanded notion of addiction and the addict, we would argue instead that the court performs addiction and the addict, that is, the drug court can be understood as doing more than simply identifying and managing a pre-existing problem or 'object': it actually produces it. Moreover, different drug courts can generate different and contrasting versions of addiction. Joh concludes that social and legal responses to addiction 'can vary widely depending on the substance' and that responses can themselves 'vary over time ' (2009: 191) . She does not take these ideas further, but as with Murphy's work, we would argue again for a performativity analysis, this time focusing on the enactment of substances as much as the state of addiction.
Legal responses and developments, that is, enact the substances in question, producing them asvariously -harmful, risky and dangerous, or as possessed of certain 'addictive properties'. As these ideas are produced, reproduced and circulated, the potential for stigmatisation of certain individuals, groups, practices or entities may either grow or diminish.
TRACING ADDICTIONS
All these ideas can, we argue, be applied to an examination of the ways addiction figures in noncriminal settings across Australia. As we will see, addiction appears in a much wider range of legal areas than might ordinarily be appreciated, and much can be gained from comparative analyses of the law. We explore three specific pieces of Australian legislation in which the notion of AOD 'addiction' or 'dependence' figures. Our aim is to draw attention to how addiction is differentially defined in law, how it is established, by whom and through what processes. In doing so we consider the assumptions that underpin (and emerge from) this legislation. We also consider some related materials, such as the explanatory memoranda that accompany the Acts and what are called the minister's second reading speeches introducing the relevant bills into parliament.
3 Crucially, these ancillary documents can in certain circumstances have legal force.
Where there is ambiguity about the meaning of a law, courts have the ability to look 'behind' the specific wording of the legislation with a view to establishing the intention of the legislators who passed the Act. 4 In what follows, we argue that much can be gained by analysing statutory instruments and relevant accompanying documents in this way, especially as they offer insights into how governments understand, make and remake the 'nature' and 'effects' of addiction in particular contexts. We also highlight a number of tensions and inconsistencies between the Acts, raising questions about the role of the law in the production and management of addiction as 'multiple' (Mol 2002) . Although the focus of this paper is upon Australian law, we argue that our findings regarding the capacity of the law to enact multiple, overlapping and inconsistent ontologies of addiction is a phenomenon likely to be repeated elsewhere, and one that warrants considerably more analysis.
ADDICTION IN THE LAW
There are a number of legal areas in which substance use and/or 'addiction' figure in Australia.
These include:
3 All legislation is accompanied by an 'explanatory memorandum' detailing the intended meaning and effect of the act. The 'Second reading speech' is a (typically more lengthy) statement read into parliamentary record about the nature, purpose and intended effect of the bill. The speech precedes parliamentary debate about the legislation. 4 In Victoria, see, for example, Section 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984.
• Personal Injury Law: First, 'addiction' may figure in tort law, as in tobacco litigation where the acquisition of lung cancer and 'addiction' might be alleged. 5 Alternatively, addiction may figure as a feature or causal component of an injury (depending on one's interpretation), such as an asbestos-related lung cancer. 6 In civil claims, a plaintiff may also allege that they have developed an addiction -to painkiller medication, for instance -as a direct result of an accident, thus seeking compensation to cover the costs of • Detention and treatment orders: Perhaps best described as public health legislation, mandatory detention and treatment orders are available in many Australian jurisdictions. 14 These orders allow for individuals with a 'severe dependence' or addiction to be detained in an addiction treatment program. Although we acknowledge that mandated treatment might be conceptualised as quasi-criminal legislation (given the possibility for coercion or force, and the curtailment of the subject's rights), this legislation is not formally characterised as such in Australia. Instead, it has an explicitly public health focus and has been formulated separately to criminal statutes. Arguably, many 'non-criminal laws' have punitive dimensions or effects, quite regardless of the way those laws are defined or understood. The differences between the purported focus and material 'effects' of legal approaches to addiction and drug use are in fact one of our central avenues of inquiry in this research.;
• Guardianship and administration: Under legislation in most Australian states and territories, applications can be made for a guardianship order on the basis that the 'affected' or 'impaired' person is unable to make decisions for her or himself. 15 Where such an order is made, the individual granted guardianship of the affected person's affairs has the power to make a range of decisions on behalf of or in respect of the addict and is expected to act in the best interests of the person who is subject to the guardianship order. Here, addiction may be deployed as grounds for such an order 16 ;
• As these examples show, issues of addiction apply to many different areas of legislation well beyond criminal contexts. In some cases it figures as the central focus of legislation -as with mandatory treatment -and in others as a component of legislation with a different focus.
Addiction may also feature in common law and the law of equity. Those tasked with making decisions about whether an 'addiction' exists vary; they are sometimes situated in the executive (as with decisions about welfare payments), or at an appeal level. The status of those presiding over cases where addiction may figure also vary: sometimes it is a magistrate or judge with tenure, other times a member of a review board or tribunal without tenure. Our aim here is not to draw any firm conclusions about the implications of this distribution of addiction across so many different legal realms. Further research into the shared and different approaches at work, and the various assumptions and judgments on which these rely, is required before this is possible. Instead our aim is to draw attention to a neglected but important domain in which addiction is constituted and bears on individual access to resources and justice. In doing so, we raise key questions about how addiction fares across these settings as a result of beliefs held among legal professionals and formalised within legal processes about the properties of different 21 For an example case where some of these issues were considered, see 0907840 [2010] RRTA 176. 22 The principal piece of relevant legislation is the Commonwealth Social Security Act 1991. 23 The distinction is important for several reasons. If a person is assessed as being eligible for a disability support pension, she or he has fewer responsibilities under the relevant legislation (such as the obligation to report to the relevant department regularly, or to actively look for work in order to receive benefits). As of the date of this article, the disability support pension is set at a higher remuneration rate than the general unemployment benefit. kinds of substances, the agency and capacity of the 'addict', notions of responsibility and power in relation to addiction, and the various ways that addiction is understood to shape capacity.
ADDICTION AND LEGISLATION
With these broad questions in mind, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of three specific pieces of Australian legislation in which addiction figures, and consider some of the implications of analysing legislation and ancillary documents in this comparative way. In the next section, we utilise the case study method that was sketched out by Annemarie Mol and John Law in
Complexities: Social Studies of Knowledge Practices (2002) and in Law's After Method (2004). According
to Mol and Law (2002) , traditional social science research tends to be predicated upon realist assumptions of the sort that we outlined earlier, or the belief, in other words, that reality is singular and stable. Traditional research methods both reflect and sustain such realist notions of the world, through implying that there is a singular, stable ontological reality that exists 'out there' for social scientists to independently, objectively observe and capture through the use of appropriate methodological tools, such as the survey. The necessary implication of such approaches is that reality exists 'anterior to … our reports of it' (Law 2004: 24-5) . In contrast, and as we have already explained, Mol and Law argue that ontology is in fact multiple, enacted via material-discursive practices and open to change. What this means is that new, more sensitive and nuanced methods are required in order to attend to the complexity, messiness and multiplicity of realities (Law 2004) . Moreover, both Mol and Law argue that methods are one of the means by which realities are made and remade, and that methods participate in the articulation and production of realities rather than the mere observance of them. In Complexities,
Mol and Law emphasise the need for new approaches to both research and academic writing that eschew claims to neatness, completeness and order, arguing that such approaches erase the multiplicity and messiness of reality, creating an 'illusion' of order, singularity and stability that is rarely appropriate. Mol and Law (2002) introduce three techniques that researchers might instead deploy in order to analyse phenomena without producing a neat or simplistic overview. These three techniques, or methods, are lists, walks and cases. Cases are 'objects of analysis that have epistemological utility without laying claim to representativeness' (Fraser and Seear 2011: 14) . Mol and Law (2002: 16) suggest that in contrast with 'the illustration that represents a larger theory, we suggest to treat cases as, again, sensitizing but also unique -as incitement to ask questions about difference and similarity' as well as 'what alters in moving from one place to another'. They go on to say that:
Because they are not, so to speak, representative of something larger (a 'theory'), cases are able to do all kinds of other work. For instance, they may sensitize the reader to events and situations elsewhere that have not been recognized so far and that may well be improbable. They may seduce the reader into continuing to read, to ask what is going to come next. They may suggest ways of thinking about and tackling other specificities, not because they are 'generally applicable' but because they may be transferable, translatable … They may act as an irritant, destabilizing expectations … Or they may work allegorically, which means that they may tell not just about what they are manifestly telling but also about something else, something that may be hard to tell directly. (Mol and Law 2002: 15) In what follows, then, we treat Australian legislation as a 'case' designed to sensitise readers to the various means by which the law participates in the production of addiction as ontologically multiple. In our examination of these laws, we ask the following questions:
• How does addiction figure in the legislation?
• How is the 'problem' defined and what criteria are cited in order to provide a definition or diagnosis?
• How is the agency and subjectivity of the addict enacted?
• How is the role of the substance enacted?
• Are there areas of uncertainty, tensions or non-coherence? And what is the significance of these?
In asking such questions, following Mol and Law (2002) , we aim to destabilise expectations regarding both the ontology of addiction and the role of the law in making and remaking addiction realities. We aim to also encourage some consideration of other places and spaces where similar processes might be unfolding. These are matters to which we shall return later in our conclusion.
The Severe Substance Dependence Treatment Act 2010
In 2009 seeking an order to detain (using force, if necessary) and treat any person with 'severe substance dependence'. The proposed bill was complex and it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a complete overview of it. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that it proposed to introduce a new mechanism for considering applications for the detention and treatment of individuals with severe substance dependence, and provided a series of safeguards to ensure that the rights of the affected person were protected.
The language of addiction is not used within the legislation. Instead, the focus is on 'severe substance dependence', a concept defined in Section 5 of the Act. That Section reads as follows:
For the purposes of this Act, a person has a severe substance dependence if-(a) the person has a tolerance to a substance; and (b) the person shows withdrawal symptoms when the person stops using, or reduces the level of use of, the substance; and (c) the person is incapable of making decisions about his or her substance use and personal health, welfare and safety due primarily to the person's dependence on the substance.
Under the legislation a person bringing an application before the magistrates' court is required to include a recommendation for detention and treatment from a suitably qualified doctor. In this respect severe substance dependence is squarely positioned as a medical issue. Although the principal Act is largely silent on who qualifies and how the recommendation is to be made, the subsequent Severe Substance Dependence Treatment Regulations 2011 address these issues. Under Section 6 of the regulations, a recommendation for a detention and treatment order may only be made by a qualified psychiatrist, addiction medicine specialist, or a medical practitioner who provides care to patients in police custody at facilities operated by the Victorian police. The regulations also include a sample schedule for the recommendation. This stipulates, in some detail, what information the prescribed medical practitioner is expected to provide. 24 The practitioner is eligible for a fee for their services in providing the recommendation. Once the recommendation is made, the application for a detention and treatment order is heard by a magistrate. The affected person has the right to appear and be legally represented at the hearing of the application. If an order is made, it is for a finite period (14 days), with a focus on medically-assisted withdrawal.
endeavours to constitute it, by defining certain attributes and behaviours (those listed in section 5) as 'severe' rather than minor or moderate.
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Beyond the use of the expression 'substance dependence', the legislation, explanatory memorandum or second reading speech contain virtually no information to indicate what theory (or theories) of addiction underpinned the construction of the Act. This is an important point given that there are multiple theories about what addiction 'is' and how it 'works' (West 2001 (West , 2006a (West , 2006b , and a recognition that important differences in effects exist between substances, especially in relation to the key markers of severe dependence cited in the Act -tolerance and withdrawal. Methamphetamine is widely considered, for example, to be highly addictive (and as such is probably considered a very pertinent substance for the Act), yet it is generally seen in medical and public health circles to be extremely unlikely to produce a withdrawal syndrome (3) However, nothing in this section makes it lawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person having hepatitis C, HIV infection or any medical condition other than addiction to a prohibited drug.
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The minister's second reading speech for this bill described the intention of the bill as ensuring that anti-discrimination laws would not be 'used in an unintended manner'. Referring directly to the Wayne Marsden case, the minister raised concerns about the 'risk' associated with understanding drug addiction as a disability under the Act, pointing to the 'concerns' of employers. The bill would also draw a distinction between 'actual' and 'perceived' addiction, such that 'employers cannot discriminate against persons who have overcome their addictions or against persons who are not in fact addicts'. Crucially, 'addiction' is not defined anywhere in the Act, so that it is unclear how an addict is 'in fact' constituted. In 2003, the Federal Government proposed similar legislation, so that the Federal DDA would specifically exclude substance 'addiction' from the definition of 'disability'. Although this bill was drafted and introduced into parliament, the legislation was never passed and eventually lapsed. We are left, then, with a curious scenario in which the principal piece of anti-discrimination legislation at the
Commonwealth level leaves open the possibility that addiction constitutes a form of 'disability' that can be mobilised in certain circumstances by an aggrieved individual, but at the state level, one form of addiction (AOD) is specifically excluded. Putting to one side practical questions about accessing relief under either or both of the Acts, and about conflicting laws, these examples demonstrate, we argue, the possibility of variations within a single legal realm in definitions of what addiction 'is', whether or not it is a disease or disability, the agency and capacity of individuals adjudged to be living with an addiction, and their rights and responsibilities under Australian law. In excluding only drug addiction from the definition of 'disability', the ADD also arguably implies that other forms of addiction might be understood as a disease, disability, or both. 29 In this way, our comparison of the DDA and ADD demonstrates at least three things. First, the ontological, medical and legal status of addiction under Australian anti-discrimination law is multiple, inconsistent and potentially contradictory. Secondly, the law (at least within the state of NSW) produces different kinds of addictions, and in so doing produces some forms of addiction as more valid and acceptable than others, insofar as the availability of legal relief can be taken to be a marker of this. Finally, addiction is constituted under anti-discrimination law as both a recognised disability, and a moral failing or moral culpability, to the extent that at least one law explicitly permits discrimination on the basis of drug addiction. In sum, the status of addiction in Australian law is, it seems from our examples, changeable and multiple. Often poorly defined, it varies in standing from invalid transgression warranting punishment to valid mitigation likely to reduce or preclude punishment.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have demonstrated that addiction figures across many different legal realms, including a range of non-criminal settings. Our overview of law and practice in Australia documents substantial case law and legislation dealing with issues around addiction and finds subtle but potentially significant variations between these in the meaning and implications of addiction. Our point, following Joh (2009) , is that it is not possible to speak of a single or consistent legal response to alcohol and other drug issues, including addiction, whether within a single jurisdiction involving pieces of legislation enacted at the same point in time, or within a broader area where more than one legislative instrument may apply. The terminology and criteria 29 Although this would appear to be a logical conclusion based on the clear language of the amending section (and the second reading speech itself), it is also arguably supported by a legal doctrine known as noscitur a sociis. The noscitur maxim is a principle of statutory construction whereby the construction of a word or words within a statutory instrument is to be construed by reference to other words and phrases in the Act (i.e. through the broader context of the legislation). So, the absence of an exclusion for other types of addiction, and the specific reference to addiction to a prohibited drug likely reinforces the notion that other forms of addiction can be forms of disability under the Act.
for determining 'addiction' regularly differ, often with little or no explanation as to why the terms and criteria have been chosen, and the processes associated with how an 'addiction' is established may also be conflicting or vague. Also, forms of addiction may be constituted differently, producing and reproducing subtle variations in how addictions 'work', and the agency and subjectivity of different 'kinds' of addicts. These differences open up a range of issues, some of which we have touched upon here. Where different language and criteria are used, legislation may be interpreted differently, so that case law and legal practice may develop along divergent trajectories. This can have major implications for the rights and responsibilities of people living in different legal jurisdictions -a point valid well beyond the present context of Australian law.
Indeed, it is unlikely that Australia is alone in its complex and multilayered legal engagements with addiction. For the reasons we outlined earlier in this paper, and in the tradition of case methods outlined by Mol and Law (2002) , we would encourage more and more comparative analyses of these legal processes internationally, and more work that examines the implications of these approaches for individuals subjected to them. In relation to the latter, we know far too little about the role of different (especially non-criminal) legal realms in the production, maintenance and/or destabilisation of the stigmatisation and marginalisation of addicts, or how these processes otherwise impact upon affected individuals. The lived experiences of individual 'addicts' may also be complicated where they are caught up in more than one legal realm where ideas about addiction, agency and responsibility are handled differently, or where addiction is constituted multiply. In all these ways, the identification and management of addictions across the legal spectrum has potentially major public health implications, with the prospect of serious repercussions for individuals who use substances and/or are framed as 'addicts', or for whom treatment is prescribed. On the basis of this research, we argue that there is a need for much more work on the place of addiction in non-criminal realms and the possible implications and 'effects' of these configurations.
